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I. INTRODUCTION
While a state may not impose conditions upon the right of
corporationslegally authorized by Congress to do business
in the state or may not place unlawful burdens upon the
interstate business of a foreign corporationlawfully in the
state, yet the state may exclude foreign corporations or
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impose upon them conditionsfor doing business in the state
where it does not conflict with federal laws.'
-Supreme

Court of Florida, 1911

Each state has the power to restrict and control within its borders the
activities of foreign corporations.2 That power is subject, however, to
limitations imposed by the United States Constitution.' Such power is
conspicuously exercised through the enactment and enforcement of state
"door-closing statutes," 4 which impose on foreign corporations certain
prerequisites both for transacting intrastate business and for pursuing
intrastate claims within the enacting state's court system. A doorclosing statute may require a foreign corporation to first "qualify" by
obtaining a state-issued certificate of authority before conducting certain
intrastate business activities.6 The statute also may address the scope of
granted, as well as the consequences for failure to properly
the authority
"qualify." 7 Due to the nature of such requirements, legal practitioners

1. Ulmer v. First Nat'l Bank, 55 So. 405, 407 (Fla. 1911).
2. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 15.01 cmt. (1984); Tasner v. U.S. Indus.,
Inc., 379 F. Supp. 803, 806 (N.D. 11. 1974) (describing as "uncontrovertible" the principle that
a state may reasonably restrict the intrastate activities of foreign corporations within
constitutional limitations).
"A corporation existing under the laws of another state is a foreign corporation in Florida
within the meaning of the [state door-closing] statute." Ulmer, 55 So. at 407.
3. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr ANN. § 15.01 cmt. (1984).
4. See Laura E. Little, Out of the Woods and Into the Rules: The Relationship Between
State ForeignCorporationDoor-Closing Statutes and FederalRules of Civil Procedure 17(b),
72 VA. L. REV. 767, 770 (1986) (classifying door-closing statutes as including provisions which
control access of foreign corporations to local courts, usually (but not always) for the purpose
of encouraging compliance with a state regulatory scheme).
5. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 15.01 (1984). Access to a state court system
for the purpose of litigating an interstate claim is not barred, however, as it would burden
interstate commerce and therefore be repugnant to the commerce clause. See William R. Crowe,
A ProposedMinimum Threshold Analysis for the Imposition of State Door-Closing Statutes, 51
FORDHAM L. REV. 1360, 1361 (1983) (citing Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 34
(1974) (holding that a state's refusal to enforce contracts relating to interstate commerce violates
the commerce clause); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 291 (1921)
(stating that any state statute which obstructs the privilege of interstate commerce is void under
the commerce clause); Jerold Panas & Partners, Inc. v. Portland Soc'y of Art, 535 F Supp. 650,
652 n.1 (D. Me. 1982) (finding a state statute that burdened interstate commerce to be
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause); Uncle Ben's Inc. v. Crowell, 482 F. Supp. 1149,
1153-54 (E.D. Ark 1980) (finding a state statute that burdened interstate commerce to be
unconstitutional)).
6. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 15.01 (1984); see also FLA. STAT. §
607.1501 (1995).
7. The Model Business Corporation Act describes the scope of the privilege obtained by
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commonly refer to state door-closing statutes as "qualification statutes."8
Since 1868, the Florida Constitution has called for a body of law
applicable to both public and private corporations.9 The most recent in
the series of general business corporation statutes adopted by the Florida
Legislature is the Florida Business Corporation Act (FBCA), effective
since July 1, 1990." The FBCA substantially mirrors the most recent
version of the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA)." Florida's
qualification statute 2 defines the concept of transacting intrastate
a certificate of authority. See MODEL BusINEsS CORP.AcT § 15.01(a) (1984). Section 15.02 of
that model act describes the consequences of transacting business in the state without first
obtaining the required certificate of authority. See MODEL BusINEsS CORP. Acr § 15.02 (1984).
8. Many authors refer to such statutes as "door-closing" or "closed-door" statutes. See,
e.g., James 0. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, What Constitutes Doing Business Within State for
Purposes of State "Closed-Door" Statute Barring Unqualified or Unregistered Foreign
Corporationfrom Local Courts-Modem Cases, 88 A.L.R. 4th 466,473 n.4 (1991); Little, supra
note 4, at 767. These terms are generally interchangeable with the term "qualification statute."
My choice to use the term "qualification statute" throughout this Note reflects modem, less
restrictive policies underlying these statutes in most states, as well my perception that the term
"qualification statute" has more recognition value among academics and practitioners who
specialize in the law of corporations.
9. See STUART R. COHN & STUART D. AMES, FLORIDA BuSINESS LAWS ANNOTATED
1995-1996, at 5 (1995).
10. See id.at 6.
11. See id. (stating that the FBCA was substantially patterned after the most recent
revision of the Model Business Corporation Act).
12. The full text of FLA. STAT. § 607.1501 (1995) is as follows:
(1)A foreign corporation may not transact business in this state until it obtains
a certificate of authority from the Department of State.
(2) The following activities, among others, do not constitute transacting
business within the meaning of subsection (1):
(a) Maintaining, defending, or settling any proceeding.
(b) Holding meetings of the board of directors or shareholders or carrying on
other activities concerning internal corporate affairs.
(c) Maintaining bank accounts.
(d)Maintaining officers or agencies for the transfer, exchange, and registration
of the corporation's own securities or maintaining trustees or depositaries with
respect to those securities.
(e) Selling through independent contractors.
(f) Soliciting or obtaining orders, whether by mail or through employees,
agents, or otherwise, if the orders require acceptance outside this state before they
become contracts.
(g) Creating or acquiring indebtedness, mortgages, and security interests in real
or personal property.
(h) Securing or collecting debts or enforcing mortgages and security interests
in property securing the debts.
(i) Transacting business in interstate commerce.
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business, and expressly requires that any foreign corporation conduct
such business only after obtaining formal authority from the state.'3
Except for two provisions, 4 Florida's qualification statute is
identical to its companion section in the MBCA."5 The statute requires
a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority from Florida's
Department of State in order to transact business in Florida.16 It does
not positively define what constitutes the transaction of intrastate
business, but instead sets forth a representative list 7 of activities that
do not constitute transacting business for purposes of determining

(j) Conducting an isolated transaction that is completed within 30 days and that
is not one in the course of repeated transactions of a like nature.
(k) Owning and controlling a subsidiary corporation incorporated in or
transacting business within this state or voting the stock of any corporation which
it has lawfully acquired.
(1) Owning a limited partnership interest in a limited partnership that is doing
business within this state, unless such limited partner manages or controls the
partnership or exercises
the powers and duties of a general partner.
(in) Owning, without more, real or personal property.
(3) The list of activities in subsection (2) is not exhaustive.
(4) This section has no application to the question of whether any foreign
corporation is subject to service of process and suit in this state under any law of
this state.
Id. FLA. STAT. § 607.1502 (1995) sets forth the consequences of failing to comply with the
requirements contained in § 607.1501.
13. See id. § 607.1501(1). But see infra notes 43-62 and accompanying text regarding
consequences of noncompliance.
14. See FLA. STAT. § 607.1501(2)(k) & (1) (1995).
15. Compare FLA. STAT. § 607.1501 (1995) with MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 15.01
(1984). Besides Florida, the following jurisdictions list activities which do not constitute the
transaction of business in terms similar to the Model Act: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. MODEL BusINESS CORP. AcT
ANN. § 15.01 statutory comparison, at 15-13 (Supp. 1996) (as of December 1, 1995). Provisions
in other jurisdictions differ either substantially or completely from § 15.01 of the Model Act.
See id.
16. See FLA. STAT. § 607.1501(1) (1995).
17. The list of activities under subsection (2) is not exhaustive. Id. § 607.1501(3) (1995).
The Official Comment to § 15.01 of the Model Business Corporation Act states that the list of
exempted activities does not constitute an attempt to inclusively define the concept of transacting
business. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 15.01, cmt. (1984). As stated earlier, the Florida doorclosing statute was patterned after the version contained in the Model Act. See supra text
accompanying note 11.
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whether a foreign corporation is required to qualify. 8 Separate sections
deal with the formalities of compliance' 9 and the consequences of
noncompliance."
Because the statute only negatively defines the concept of transacting
intrastate business, it is not always easy to determine whether and on
what basis a foreign corporation is required to qualify.2 ' This dilemma
is exemplified particularly by the issues whether and when a foreign
corporation must obtain a certificate of authority to conduct lending
activities in Florida. These issues may arise in conjunction with a
request by a foreign corporate lender for the issuance of a third-party
legal opinion from a Florida borrower's attorney concerning the
enforceability of a loan agreement.22 A 1991 report from The Florida
Bar Opinion Committee took the position that qualified Florida counsel
may reasonably give opinions as to whether compliance with state
qualification statutes is necessary.'

18. See FLA. STAT. § 607.1501(2)(a)-(m) (1995).
19. See id. § 607.1503.
20. See id. § 607.1502.
21. See Scott FitzGibbon & Donald W. Glazer, Legal Opinions on Incorporation,Good
Standing, and Qualificationto Do Business, 41 Bus. LAW. 461, 478 (1986) (stating that such
a determination requires a thorough knowledge of corporate location and activity).
22. See Florida Bar Opinion Committee, Report on Standardsfor Opinions of Florida
Counsel of the Special Committee on Opinion Standards of The FloridaBar Business Law
Section, 46 Bus. LAW. 1407, 1413, 1427, 1429-30 (Aug. 1991) [hereinafter Opinion Standards
Report or Report]. The Opinion Standards Report sought to establish standards for opinions
issued by Florida attorneys to third parties in commercial transactions. Id. at 1410. The Report
defined a legal opinion as
a formal writing expressing a lawyer's informed understanding of the legal
principles applicable to a specific transaction or a particular aspect of that
transaction. As such, it represents a reasoned judgment by the attorney as to how
the highest court in the applicable jurisdiction would decide a legal issue if it were
presented with that issue on the date of the opinion.
Id. at 1411. The Report recognized that some legal opinions are "commercially reasonable" and
some are not, and the Report was written with the intent "to provide reasonable standards as to
what opinions Florida lawyers should be asked to give on particular issues." Id. The Report took
"the position that it is not a conflict of interest for an attorney to render an opinion to the other
party in a transaction." Id. at 1413. That obligation is subject, of course, to the ethical duties
imposed by the Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated by the Florida Supreme Court. See
id. at 1412-13. The Report further stated that, under The Florida Bar Standard of Professionalism
4.4, a Florida borrower's attorney is obligated to advise a third-party lender of any conclusion
reached as to the unenforceability of any portion of the loan agreement against the borrower. See
id. at 1413.
23. See id. at 1430. The Opinion Standards Report stated that opinions regarding
qualification status generally are requested in three potential forms:
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As this Note shows, whether the in-state lending activities of foreign
corporations are potentially excluded from Florida's definition of
transacting business is not as clear as an initial reading of the Florida
qualification statute would indicate. Further, the guidelines for factually
analyzing the issues are somewhat murky.24 In Part II, this Note
addresses the purpose of Florida's qualification statute, the potential
consequences of noncompliance, and the constitutional limitations on the
statute's application. Part II considers the key provisions and principles
which may be applicable to foreign corporate lenders in light of both
Florida case law and case law from other jurisdictions construing similar
provisions. Part IV focuses on a problematic phrase contained in an
official comment to section 15.01 of the MBCA and its implications for
foreign corporate lenders. Finally, Part V is a cursory discussion of
conceptual distinctions between transacting business under the state
qualification statute and transacting business for other purposes. This
Note does not discuss other related provisions-specifically those
pertaining to banking, mortgage lending, corporate taxation and service
of process--except as those provisions are implicated directly.

The corporation is qualified and in good standing (1) in each jurisdiction in which
it owns or leases property or conducts business; (2) in each jurisdiction in which
the nature of its business or properties requires it to be qualified; or (3) in each
jurisdiction which requires qualification except to the extent that failure to qualify
would not have a material adverse impact on the corporation.
Id. at 1429. The Report seems to assume that such opinions are generally issued by selfdesignated experts in matters of foreign law, and each opinion may cover the status of the
foreign corporation in a number of jurisdictions. See id. at 1429-30. This Note speaks only to
an opinion as to whether a foreign corporation must qualify pursuant to Florida law.
24. See id. at 1429. The Opinion Standards Report observes:
To give an opinion on qualification, counsel will have to determine the
activities that are carried on and the assets that are owned by the corporation in
various jurisdictions. This will require a certificate from an officer of the
corporation that describes the actual activities and assets of the corporation in other
jurisdictions. Based on these facts, counsel must make a legal judgment as to
whether or not qualification is required in each jurisdiction, Counsel may not rely
on an officer's certificate that merely contains a legal conclusion reciting the
jurisdictions in which the corporation is "doing business" (a legal concept which
is defined differently in different states).
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II. FLORIDA'S QUALIFICATION STATUTE
A. Brief History and Purpose
In the early twentieth century, the concept of transacting business
was characterized generally by a state policy aimed toward excluding

" 'all outsiders from engaging in commercial activities in [the state's]
boundaries.'

"'

Prior to 1907, Florida did not statutorily restrict the

transaction of intrastate business by foreign corporations.26 Florida's
enactment of chapter 5717, Acts 1907, rendered the in-state activities of
noncomplying foreign corporations "absolutely unlawful."'27 Under this
early statute, any contract formed within the state by a foreign corporation prior to the corporation's compliance with the statute was void.2"
The Supreme Court of Florida early recognized the state's right to
exclude foreign corporations or to restrict their activities as long as the
restrictions did not conflict with federal laws.29 The court acknowledged that a state may exercise such a right in order to "prevent

25. See William Arthur Holby, Note, "Doing Business": Defining State Control Over

Foreign Corporations,32 VAND. L. REV. 1105, 1105 & n.1 (1979) (quoting Eleanor Isaacs, An
Analysis of Doing Business, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 1018, 1018 (1925)).
26. See Hogue v. D.N. Morrison Constr. Co., 156 So. 377, 378 (Fla. 1934).
27. See id. (citing Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Jordan, 71 So. 760 (Fla. 1916)).
28. See Circular Adver. Co. v. American Mercantile Co., 63 So. 3, 6 (Fla. 1913). The
court quoted §§ 1 and 4 of chapter 5717, Acts of 1907:
Section 1. That no foreign corporation shall transact business or acquire, hold
or dispose of property in this state until it shall have filed in the office of the
Secretary of State a duly authenticated copy of its charter or articles of incorporation, and shall have received from him a permit to transact business in this state.
Section 4. Every contract made by or on behalf of any foreign corporation
affecting its liability or relating to property within the state before it shall have
complied with the provisions of this act shall be void on its behalf and on behalf
of its assigns, but shall be enforceable against it or them.
Id. The CircularAdvertising court recognized that these regulations were not intended to apply,
either directly or indirectly, to interstate transactions. See id. at 6. But see Commercial Nat'l
Bank v. Jordan, 71 So. 760, 762 (Fla. 1916) (stating that the statute did not expressly declare
all contracts made by or on behalf of any foreign corporation prior to compliance absolutely
void, and also stating that Ulmer did find that such was the legislative intent). The Jordan court
stated, "The clear legislative purpose was to render such contracts unenforceable in the hands
of the corporation or its assigns, but enforceable against it or them .... While the statute uses
the word 'void,' it describes a 'voidable' contract." Id. at 762.
29. See Ulmer, 55 So. at 407; see also supra quoted text accompanying note 1.
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imposition or injustice from being practiced within its territory, and to
provide for the general welfare of its people." 30
A 1915 modification to the Florida qualification statute provided that
in-state contracts formed by noncomplying foreign corporations were
valid but unenforceable until authority to transact business was
obtained.3 ' Thus, the statute lost much of its exclusionary character.
The current version of the Florida qualification statute does not affect
the validity of contracts or title conveyances made by foreign corporations within the state.32 This more liberal policy has resulted naturally
from the development of a nationwide business community and
marketplace. Because of this market expansion, Florida, like many
states, is more prone to try to control rather than exclude the in-state
activities of foreign corporations.' In fact, "door-closing statute" is
now a bit of a misnomer when applied to Florida's qualification law.3

30. See Ulmer, 55 So. at 407. In McCollum Aviation, Inc. v. CIM Assocs., Inc., 438 F
Supp. 245, 248 (S.D. Fla. 1977), the court found that the "purpose of encouraging corporate
qualification for the benefit of the state's citizenry" expressly recognized in Ulmer is a
substantive purpose, so that the Florida door-closing statute takes "precedence over Rule 17(b)
[of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] because under the Rules Enabling Act, as developed
by Hanna [v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965)], a Federal Rule cannot abridge an existing
substantive right." The McCollum court cited Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535
(1949) as the definitive case pertaining to "the primacy of state door-closing statutes in diversity
cases." See id. See also Little, supra note 4, at 767, for a more thorough discussion of this issue.
31. See Hogue, 156 So. at 378 (citing Brecht v. Bur-Ne Co., 108 So. 173 (Fla. 1926);
Blackshear Mfg. Co. v. Sorey, 121 So. 103 (Fla. 1929)); see also Herbert H. Pape, Inc., v.
Finch, 136 So. 496, 500 (Fla. 1931) (recognizing that when stockholders or officers transact
intrastate business in the name of a corporation not authorized to transact such business, they
are subject to individual liability as partners).
32. See FLA. STAT. § 607.1502(e) (1995). The Florida Bar has stated that "[i]f a foreign
corporation conveys property in connection with activities which require a permit to transact
business and it does not have the permit, the corporation will be subject to statutory
penalties.... However, the conveyance of title will be valid." FLORIDA BAR UNIFORM TITLE
STANDARDS 4.4, ForeignCorporations(June 1996) (citing FLA. STAT. § 607.1502 (1995)); FLA.
STAT. § 607.1502(5) (1995); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY CoMPLEX TRANSACTIONS § 9.6 (CLE
1993)); see also Crockin v. Boston Store of Ft. Myers, 188 So. 853, 857-58 (Fla. 1939) (holding
that, where an unqualified foreign corporation acquired good and legal title to certain certificates
and capital stock in a Florida corporation, such title carried with it the power to vest in a
successor the same clear legal title, notwithstanding the fact that the acquisition of title by an
unqualified foreign corporation might result in certain penalties).
33. See Holby, supra note 25, at 1105.
34. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 15.01, annotation, HistoricalBackground,
at 15-9 (Supp. 1996).
35. See infra pt. II.B. for a discussion of the consequences of failing to comply with
Florida's qualification statute.
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Virtually all states impose registration requirements upon foreign
corporations transacting intrastate business3 6 and prescribe penalties for
noncompliance with those requirements.37 There are at least three
purposes that a state may have in defining the transaction of business
and inquiring whether the in-state activities of foreign corporations
satisfy that definition." First, the state may have an interest in controlling the access that foreign corporations have to that state's court
system.39 Second, the state may have a strong economic interest in
taxing foreign corporations for the privilege of transacting intrastate
business.40 And finally, the state may have a policy interest in regulating the intrastate business activities conducted by foreign corporations.4 A state has considerable leeway in imposing consequences on
a foreign corporation that falls to comply with the statute.42
B. Consequences of Noncompliance in Florida
The consequences of transacting intrastate business without obtaining
a certificate of authority are addressed in a separate section of the
Florida Statutes.43 That section provides that a foreign corporation
transacting business in Florida without first acquiring a certificate of
authority is barred from maintaining a proceeding in the state court
system until it obtains that authority.' This relatively mild consequence
36. See Little, supra note 4, at 770 (pointing out that the requirements generally include
designation of local agents to receive service of process and filing of copies of charters or
articles of incorporation, names and addresses of principals, and annual financial reports).
For a list of statutes falling into the category of door-closing or qualification statutes, see
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 15.01, statutes, at 15-11 to -12 (Supp. 1996) [As of
December 1, 1995]. For pre-MBCA (1984) discussions of this topic, see, for example, Kratovil
& Weiler, Foreign Corporations Lending Money in Illinois: Constitutional and Statutory
Problems, 9 J. MAR. J. 295 (1976); Note, Foreign Corporations:What Constitutes "Doing
Business" Under New York's QualificationStatute?, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1042 (1976).
37. See Little, supra note 4, at 770.
38. See J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSmIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 307 (4th ed.
1978).
39. See id. FLA. STAT. § 607.1501(4) (1995) states, 'This section has no application to the
question of whether any foreign corporation is subject to service of process and suit in this state
under any law of this state." Florida's bifurcation of its interest in subjecting foreign
corporations to service of process from its interest in controlling access to state courts does not
mean that either interest has diminished. Rather, service of process issues are now addressed by
separate sections of the Florida Statutes.
40. See Little, supra note 4, at 770 & n.22, 802 & nn.209-1 1; see also Holby, supranote
33, at 1106.
41. See Holby, supra note 33, at 1106.
42. See infra pt. I.C.
43. See FLA. STAT. § 607.1502 (1995).
44. See id. § 607.1502(1).
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is tempered further by the provision that a court may stay a proceeding
either to determine whether a certificate of authority is required, or to
45
allow the corporation to obtain the required certificate. The section
46
does not impair a foreign corporation's ability to defend an action or
to assert a counterclaim, although the corporation must first procure a
47
certificate of authority before it can obtain affirmative recovery. A
suit will not be abated merely because a foreign corporation fails to
qualify prior to initiating the proceeding.48 Further, it is not mandatory
for foreign corporations to comply with the statute in order to file
claims to recover unpaid balances on notes executed and delivered in
Florida,49 as long as the corporation is not otherwise transacting
intrastate business and the claim does not arise out of the transaction of
intrastate business.50
As one source points out, failure to obtain a required certificate of
authority may both impede the litigation objectives of the noncomplying
corporation and result in certain penalties, but such failure does not
render invalid the contracts and transactions entered into by the foreign
corporation within the state of Florida.5 Nor does it really mean that
the foreign corporation may not transact intrastate business without first
obtaining a certificate of authority, contrary to what the qualification
statute itself indicates.5 2 Rather, a noncomplying foreign corporation is

45. See id. § 607.1502(3).
46. See Brecht v. Bur-Ne Co., 108 So. 173, 175 (Fla. 1926) (construing § 4098, Revised
General Statutes).
47. See FLA. STAT. § 607.1502(2) (1995); COHN & AMES, supra note 9, at 187. The
prohibition in subsection (1) applies both to actions in state court and to diversity actions in
federal court. See id. The prohibition is not self-executing, but must be asserted as an affirmative
defense. See id. at 188.
48. See Burton v. Oliver Farm Equip. Sales Co., 163 So. 468,469 (Fla. 1935) (construing
§ 4098, Revised General Statutes of 1920, and § 6029, Compiled General Laws of 1927). FLA.
STAT. § 607.1502(2)(a) (1995) similarly 'refers only to a foreign corporation's ability to
"maintain a proceeding," and not to its ability to initiate a suit.
49. See Al Wilson's Power-Ful Displays, Inc. v. Morgan Adhesive, Inc.. 259 So. 2d 166,
167 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972).
50. See infra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
51. See COHN & AMES, supra note 9, at 185; see also Frantz v. McBee Co., 77 So. 2d
796, 797 (Fla. 1955) (holding that a foreign corporation that had failed to comply with the state
door-closing statute was nevertheless entitled to take advantage of the exclusive remedy
provision of the Florida Workmen's Compensation Act, as incident to the corporation's valid
employment contract with the plaintiff's decedent); Scalise v. National Utility Serv., Inc., 120
F.2d 938, 940 (5th Cir. 1941) (observing that the failure of a foreign corporation to qualify does
not affect the legality of its in-state contracts).
52. See COHN & AMES, supra note 9, at 185.
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likely to face costs and inconveniences that have accrued prior to the
time the need for compliance is revealed.53
Because it is not always clear whether a given foreign corporation
must comply with the statute,' 4 a corporation might choose not to
comply and might deliberately assume the risk of facing the consequences later because the corporation does not wish to automatically render
itself liable for certain fees and taxes. Such a tactic might be adopted as
a calculated risk in light of the knowledge that noncompliance with the
statute generally is raised as a defense in litigation of a claim initiated
by the noncomplying foreign corporation,55 and mere maintenance of
a lawsuit within Florida does not constitute the transaction of busi56
ness.
Such a maneuver could pose a significant risk, however, due to the
penalty provision contained in the statute.57 The penalties imposed by
the Florida qualification statute are more stringent than the penalties
imposed by the corresponding section of the MBCA, which only calls
for a civil penalty.5" Florida imposes a civil penalty ranging from $500
to $1000 for each year during which a foreign corporation transacts
business without properly obtaining a certificate of authority.59 Additionally, the state may exact all fees and taxes which would have been
imposed had the foreign corporation "duly applied for and received
authority to transact business in [Florida]."' This would include any
interest or tax penalties accruing as a result of the nonfiling and
nonpayment of such fees and taxes.6 The state may exact additional
penalties for failure to pay tax due to negligence or intentional disregard
53. See id.
54. This is particularly true in light of the confusion caused by Official Comment 6 to
MBCA § 15.01. See discussion infra pt. IV.
55. See, e.g., Lilly, 366 U.S. at 276 (discussed infra in text accompanying notes 81-97).
56. See FLA. STAT. § 607.1501(2)(a) (1995); see also Corporate Air Fleet v. Ellis, 324 So.
2d 719, 720 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) (construing FLA. STAT. § 613.01 et seq., repealed by Laws
1975, c. 75-250, § 139).
57. See COHN & AMES, supra note 9, at 187 (noting that Florida law adds past fees and
taxes to the civil penalty suggested by the MBCA).
58. See MODEL BusINEss CORP.Acr § 15.02(d) (1984).
59. See FLA. STAT. § 607.1502(4) (1995).
60. See id.
61. See, e.g., id. § 220.21 (imposing a duty of compliance on every taxpayer liable for tax
imposed by the Florida income tax code); id. § 220.31 (imposing a due date for payment of
income tax on every taxpayer required to file a state income tax return); id. § 220.211
(authorizing the imposition of penalties on taxpayers who file "incomplete returns"); id. §
220.801 (authorizing penalties for failure to timely file tax returns); id. § 220.807 (regarding the
determination of the rate of interest accrual); id. § 220.809 (authorizing the imposition of interest
on unpaid tax and penalties); id. § 95.091(3) (stating the limitations on the ability of the
Department of Revenue to determine and assess the amount of any tax, penalty or interest due).
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62
of the obligations imposed by the Florida income tax code. The
degree of calculated risk, therefore, may vary with the size and financial
condition of any given foreign corporation.

C. ConstitutionalLimitations
The most important constitutional limitation applicable to state
qualification statutes is the power of Congress not only to regulate
interstate
interstate commerce,63 but also to limit state interference with
65 the United
Inc.,
Church,
Bruce
commerce." For instance, in Pike v.
States Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state statute that required
cantaloupes grown in one state to be packed in certain containers before
shipment out of state.66 Under the Pike test, the state's interest in
regulating a transaction is weighed against the burden the transaction
places on interstate commerce.' Statutes found to burden interstate
6
commerce are routinely held invalid. ' The Pike precedent generally
limits the ability of states to interfere with interstate commerce.
A specific limitation on the applicability of state qualification statutes
came with the United States Supreme Court opinion in Allenberg Cotton
Co. v. Pittman.69 In Pittman, the Court held that a Tennessee cotton
merchant could not constitutionally be required to qualify to transact
business in Mississippi. 0 The Court reasoned that the cotton
merchant's in-state presence was too limited to justify subjecting it to
the Mississippi qualification law7 ' where the merchant had no office or
72
warehouse in Mississippi, and did not regularly solicit business there.
Further, the merchant's contracts were arranged through an independent
broker 73who had no authority to enter into contracts on the merchant's
behalf.
62. See id. § 220.803.
63. This power is pursuant to the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. (stating that Congress shall have the power to "regulate
Commerce... among the Several States").
64. See Jeremy T. Rosenblum & Keith S. Marlowe, Commerce Clause Limitations on
State Laws Affecting InterstateLending Programs,50 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 86, 86 (1996)
(citing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987); Maine v. Taylor, 477
U.S. 131, 137 (1986)).
65. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
66. See id. at 138, 146.
67. See id. at 142.
68. See Rosenblum & Marlowe, supra note 64, at 87 n.6.
69. 419 U.S. 20 (1974).
70. See Pittman,419 U.S. at 33-34.
71. See id. at 33.
72. See id.
73. See id.
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Pittman was not decided under the Pike test, as pointed out in the
dissenting opinion by Justice Rehnquist.74 Therefore, Pittman seems to
represent a special rule applicable to state qualification statutes. 75
Depending on the factual circumstances, the Pittman holding potentially
provides the basis for a foreign corporate lender to argue that its lending
activities do not constitute a sufficient in-state presence which would
76
justify requiring it to qualify in order to transact business in Florida.
By implication, the absence of an in-state office or the regular solicitation of in-state business would potentially refute the imposition of a
qualification requirement under Pittman.' One recent report has
warned, however, that, "standing alone... [Pittman] represents too
weak a precedent to support an interstate lender's determination to
ignore foreign state qualification or licensing laws. 7' This assertion
was made despite recognition that qualification laws, such as the Florida
qualification statute, "generally do not impose significant burdens on
out-of-state lenders."79 The same report speculated that the Pittman
precedent may be either overruled or reconciled with Pike at some time
in the future." That remains to be seen.
At the other end of the spectrum from Pittman is an earlier United
States Supreme Court opinion that indicates the sort of facts that may
support a finding, in a constitutional sense, that a foreign corporation is
conducting intrastate business. In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On-Drugs,
Inc.,8 a foreign pharmaceutical corporation filed suit in a New Jersey
state court to enjoin a New Jersey defendant from selling the
corporation's products at prices lower than the fixed minimum retail
price designated in contracts between the corporation and other New
Jersey retailers.8 2 The defendant moved for dismissal on the basis that
the plaintiff-corporation had failed to comply with the New Jersey
qualification statute. 3 The plaintiff claimed that its business in New
Jersey was solely interstate in nature, but the Court disagreed, finding
that the plaintiff conducted its business through both interstate and
74. See id. at 37-39 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
75. See Rosenblum & Marlowe, supra note 64, at 87.
76. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (stating the characteristics that do not

give rise to qualification necessity).
77. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (indicating that factors potentially
contributing to adequate in-state presence include the establishment of an in-state office or
warehouse and regular in-state solicitation of business).
78. Rosenblum & Marlowe, supra note 64, at 88.
79. See id. at 86.

80. See id. at 87-88.
81. 366 U.S. 276 (1961).
82. See id. at 276-77.
83. See id. at 277.
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intrastate channels.84 Consistent with prior precedent,85 the Court
recognized that the plaintiff could send sales personnel into a state in
order to promote interstate trade without subjecting itself to state
regulation.86 However, also consistent with prior precedent," the Court
pointed out that a foreign corporation that conducts both interstate and
intrastate business cannot "escape state regulation merely because it is
also engaged in interstate commerce." 8
The facts which the Court deemed determinative of the intrastate
nature of the Lilly plaintiff's business were as follows: 9 The plaintiff
maintained an office in New Jersey.' Its name was displayed on the
door of the office and on the tenant registry in the building lobby, and
was in the local telephone directory under "pharmaceutical products."'"
The plaintiff leased the New Jersey office space from one of its
employees, who served as a district marketing manager, and the
plaintiff directly paid the office secretary's salary.93 Additionally, there
were eighteen other salaried employees paid to solicit business on behalf
of the plaintiff from New Jersey pharmacists, physicians, and hospitals." The plaintiff made available to retailers free advertising and
promotional materials, and provided the Lilly defendant with free
announcements for mailing to members of the medical profession.95
The Court found that the Lilly plaintiff was directly participating in

84. See id. at 277, 278.
85. See id. at 278-79.
86. See id. at 279.
87. See id.
88. See id.; cf DeKalb Cablevision Corp. v. Press Assoc., Inc., 232 S.E.2d 353, 354-55
(Ga. 1977) (holding it necessary to determine the dominant features of a transaction which is
both interstate and intrastate in nature, so that compliance with the qualification statute is
necessary if in-state activities are not merely incidental to the interstate features, but constitute
a substantial local and domestic business apart from the interstate business involved).
89. See Lilly, 366 U.S. at 279-80; cf. International Text-Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91,
100 (1910) (holding that a Kansas door-closing statute which imposed a registration requirement
on a foreign corporation that "conducted by preparing and publishing instruction papers,

textbooks, and illustrative apparatus for courses of study to be pursued by means of correspondence, and the forwarding, from time to time, of such publications and apparatus to students"
burdened interstate commerce and was therefore unconstitutional, despite the fact that the
corporation paid a fixed salary and commission to a Kansas solicitor-collector who maintained
an office at his own expense to solicit students and collect fees on behalf of the foreign
corporation).
90. See Lilly, 366 U.S. at 279.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 279-80.
94. See id. at 280.
95. See id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol49/iss1/5

14

Bond: Florida's Corporate Qualification Statute: Implications for Forei
FLORIDA'S CORPORATE QUALUFICA77ON STATUTE

intrastate commerce that went beyond mere interstate commerce with
New Jersey wholesalers.96 The fact that the plaintiff's in-state activities
were primarily promotional and service-oriented, and not "systematic
solicitation of orders," did not render the plaintiff's 'in-state activities
solely interstate in nature. 7
In construing the Florida qualification statute as it has evolved over
the years, the Supreme Court of Florida has considered the constitutional
issues arising under the Commerce Clause. Specifically, in Circular
Advertising Co. v. American Mercantile Co.,98 a foreign corporation
sued on a promissory note for advertising materials prepared out of state
by the plaintiff and shipped to the Florida defendant. 9 The plaintiff
had similar dealings with customers in other states."0 The court found
that the transactions on which the claim was predicated were matters of
interstate commerce. 01 Thus, the promissory note resulting from those
transactions was incidental to interstate commerce, and therefore was not
subject to state regulation." The court declared that "if the state
cannot, under the law, directly discriminate against or burden interstate
commerce, it cannot do so by indirection. ' ' "mAs such, Florida courts
are likely to be conservative in their consideration of the constitutional
issues and predictably protective of the boundaries set by the United
States Supreme Court in construing the Commerce Clause."

96. See id. at 281.
97. See id. at 282.
98. 63 So. 3 (Fla. 1913).
99. See id. at 6.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.; cf.McCollum Aviation, Inc. v. CIM Associates, Inc., 446 F Supp. 511, 512
(S.D. Fla. 1978) (finding that a foreign corporation's noncompliance with the Florida doorclosing statute did not bar it from suing on a breach of contract claim for the sale of an aircraft,
where the transaction was the plaintiff's sole contact with the state and the cause of action
apparently arose under the laws of interstate commerce); Direct Mail Specialist, Inc. v. Terra
Mar Group, Inc., 434 So. 2d 1027, 1029 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (holding that a direct mail
company was exempt from compliance with the Florida door-closing statute where it accepted
agreements outside the state and its letter advertisements, telephone solicitations and
merchandise shipments were conducted exclusively through interstate channels).
103. See CircularAdver., 63 So. at 6.
104. See infra text accompanying notes 132-38 (discussing Kar Prods., Inc. v. Acker, 217
So. 2d 595 (Fla. Ist DCA 1969)).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1997

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 5
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

III. APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE TO
FOREIGN CORPORATE LENDERS

A. Key Provisions
Of particular consequence to the interests of foreign corporate lenders
is the subsection of the Florida qualification statute that lists representative activities that do not constitute transacting intrastate business."
The subsection states that the creation or acquisition of "indebtedness,
mortgages, and security interests in real or personal property" and the
"[s]ecuring or collecting [of] debts or enforcing [of] mortgages and
security interests in property securing the debts" do not constitute the
16
transaction of business as contemplated by the statute. 0 Further
excluded from the statutory definition of transacting business are
isolated transactions completed within thirty days (but not "in the course
of repeated transactions of a like nature""), and any business activity
that qualifies as interstate commerce.' °8
Facially, these provisions seem to exclude all conceivable in-state
lending activities conducted by foreign corporations from the definition
of transacting business as contemplated by the Florida qualification
statute1 °9 Further, they indicate that the secured or unsecured status of
such transactions is irrelevant. " It is hard to conceive of any loanrelated transaction which would not qualify as either the acquisition of
indebtedness, mortgages, or security interests, or the securing or
collecting of such debts, mortgages, or interests once they were
111
acquired. The "isolated transactions" provision gives a foreign lender
even greater leeway. It is conceivable, though generally improbable, that
a foreign corporate lender could theoretically engineer a series of sizable
corporate refinancing or recapitalization loans into a single, "isolated"
1
transaction in order to bypass the qualification requirement. Finally,
it is possible that the in-state lending activities of a foreign corporation

105. See FLA. STAT. § 607.1501(2) (1995).
106. See id. § 607.1501(2)(g), (h).
107. See id. § 607.1501(2)(j).
108. See id. § 607.1501(2)(i).
109. See id. § 607.1501(2).
110. See id. § 607.1501(2)(g) (excluding the creation of mortgages and security interests
from the statutory definition of transacting business).
111. See id. § 607.1501(2)(j).
112. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 15.01, official comment (1984) (regarding isolated
transactions). That official comment indicates that either a continuing transaction or a series of
repeated transactions may fall within the "safe harbor" of the isolated transaction provision as
long as they are completed within the 30-day period. See id.
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might be considered strictly interstate in nature, so that compliance with
the Florida qualification statute would not be required."'
B. General Principles
1. Florida
Florida courts have had numerous occasions to consider the nature
and extent of the in-state activities of foreign corporations under the
Florida qualification statute.' However, few Florida cases have
as a basis for
scrutinized the lending activities of foreign corporations
1 5 The leading Florida
requirement.
imposing the state qualification
116
case to deal with this issue is Batavia, Ltd. v. United States. The
Batavia appellant, a foreign corporation registered under the laws of the
Cayman Islands, sought to foreclose 7on a mortgage note and deed for
real property located in Florida." The applicable provisions of
Florida's qualification statute were essentially the same as the current
1
version,"1 and the court was construing them for the first time.
The applicable version of the statute provided that the creation,
acquisition, enforcement, and collection of indebtedness, mortgages or
property were not considered
other security interests in real or personal
2
'
transacting business in the state."
The Batavia court found that the "express wording of the statute"
excluded the appellant from the registration requirement, based on the
information available to the court.' It reasoned that the applicable
provisions were worded with the obvious purpose of encouraging
foreign corporate investment." Presumably the court considered the
appellant's mortgage note and deed the3 sort of foreign corporate
investment contemplated by the statute." It relied on previous deciin
113. See FLA. STAT. § 607.1501(2)(i) (1995) (excluding the transaction of business
Marlowe,
&
Rosenblum
generally
see
requirement);
interstate commerce from the qualification
and licensing
supra note 64, at 86 (discussing the constitutionality of imposing qualification
engaging
requirements, and record and office maintenance requirements on foreign corporations
in interstate lending programs).
114. See, e.g., CircularAdver., 63 So. at 3.
115. See infra note 124.
116. 393 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
117. Id. at 1208.
in
118. See FLA. STAT. § 607.354(1), (2)(g) & (2)(h) (1980) (repealed and recodified
(1995)).
(h)
&
(2)(g)
607.1501(1),
§
STAT.
FLA.
at
form
same
the
essentially
119. See Batavia, 393 So. 2d at 1208.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
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sions rendered by the Second and Third District Courts of Appeal that
"foreign corporations may sue on notes executed and delivered in
Florida without qualifying to do business in Florida."'24 Significantly,
however, the court did not end the matter there. Instead, it remanded the
case for determination whether the suit on the mortgage note and deed
was the only type of business the appellant was conducting in Florida
which 'might
entitle it to the "benefits, if any, afforded under th[e]
statute. ' z"
Batavia may mean at least three things to a foreign corporation
seeking to determine whether its in-state lending activities call for
compliance with the Florida qualification statute. First, the mere act of
acquiring indebtedness, whether or not secured by personal or real
property located within the state, is not a per se justification for
requiring compliance.'26 This is consistent with a plain meaning
interpretation of the statute itself 27 Second, the state has an interest
in encouraging foreign corporations to create such indebtedness, and
courts are likely to take that into consideration before finding that
compliance is necessary." Finally, although Florida courts are likely
to find that the creation of such indebtedness does not constitute per se
transaction of intrastate business, the inquiry may not stop there. 29
The nature and extent of a foreign corporation's other in-state contacts
also will be considered in determining whether qualification is required."3 The holding in Batavia is, therefore, of limited help in
predicting the outcome of such an inquiry under different circumstanc13
es.'
Significantly, even if a Florida court finds a foreign corporation's instate business to be solely interstate in nature, it may nevertheless
require the corporation to comply with the qualification statute in order
124. See id. (citing Corporate Air Fleet v. Ellis, 324 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) and
Al Wilson's Power-Ful Displays, Inc. v. Morgan Adhesive, Inc., 259 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 3d DCA
1972) as already permitting what the enactment of the applicable provisions accomplished).
125. See id.
126. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
127. See FLA. STAT. § 607.1501(2)(g)-(h) (1995); see also Batavia, 393 So. 2d at 1208.
128. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
129. See supra text accompanying note 125.
130. See supra text accompanying note 125; see also Integrated Container Servs., Inc. v.
R.K. Overstreet, 375 So. 2d 1146, 1149-50 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (holding that, where plaintiff's
activities went beyond procuring orders for out of state acceptance or merely transacting
business in interstate or foreign commerce, but extended to servicing, handling, storage, repair,
and maintenance of freight shipping containers, the plaintiff was transacting business in Florida).
131. Bataviarepresents a situation where the transaction of intrastate business has not been
conducted. But the case does not give much guidance as to what specific factors would
constitute the transaction of intrastate business.
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to maintain a specific claim, due to the nature of the claim itself. For
example, a decade prior to Batavia, in Kar Products, Inc. v. Acker, 132
a foreign corporation sought to enforce a noncompete agreement against
an in-state defendant who had been employed by the corporation to
distribute automotive parts.33 The Acker court recognized that a
foreign corporation's solicitation of orders through an in-state agent or
representative does not necessarily characterize the corporation's
business as intrastate, rather than interstate, in nature.M
The Acker court stated that, in order for a foreign corporation to be
permitted to pursue a claim in a Florida court, the corporation must do
two things. First, it must demonstrate "that the only business it transacts
in Florida is exclusively of an interstate character." 3 ' Second, it must
show that the claim itself is based on "a right acquired... under the
federal constitution or laws in interstate commerce. '1 36 Because the
Acker claim was based on a private right arising out of an employment
contract between the two parties, and not incidental to an interstate
transaction, the court stayed further prosecution of the plaintiffcorporation's claim pending its compliance with the Florida qualification
statute.' 37 It is important to note that the court reached this conclusion
despite the fact that it regarded the plaintiff-corporation's in-state
3 8 Essentially, therefore,
business as solely interstate in nature.Y
whether

132. 217 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969).
133. See id. at 596.
134. See id. at 597; see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276, 278-79
(1961) (citing Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887)).
135. See Acker, 217 So. 2d at 597-98.
136. See id. at 598; see also supra notes 81-97 and accompanying text (discussing Lilly,
366 U.S. at 276).
137. See Acker, 217 So. 2d at 598-99; cf. Lawson Prods., Inc. v. Tifco Indus., Inc., 660 F
Supp. 892, 895-96 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (applying the Florida qualification statute in a diversity
case, and holding that the plaintiff's claim, which arose from a noncompete clause in a sales
agreement with a Florida resident, was analogous to the claim in Acker, and therefore not a right
derived from the laws of interstate commerce).
138. See Acker, 217 So. 2d at 597. The Acker holding was built on the foundation set
earlier by the Florida Supreme Court in Blackshear Mfg. Co. v. Sorey, 121 So. 103 (Fla. 1929).
Blackshearinvolved a suit initiated by a foreign corporation to enforce payment on a promissory
note against a Florida defendant. See id. at 103. The defense was raised concerning the fact that
the plaintiff-corporation had not qualified to transact intrastate business. See id. at 104. The
Blackshear court stated that the Florida door-closing statute "does not preclude a foreign
corporation, which has not complied with the statute, from seeking the adjudication of its rights
in the courts of this state, which it acquired under the federal Constitution or laws in interstate
traffic." Id. at 104; cf Hogue v. D. N. Morrison Const. Co., 156 So. 377, 379 (Fla. 1934)
(finding that foreign corporations who had furnished labor and material on a construction project
in violation of the Florida door-closing statute "were not in a position to acquire, and did not
acquire, [mechanics'] liens which are entirely creatures of the statutes of the state."). This is
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a foreign corporation's activities are intrastate in nature within the
meaning of the Florida qualification statute and whether the nature of
a specific claim requires compliance with the statute are two separate
issues.
2. Other Jurisdictions
The interstate commerce issues already addressed comprise a
common theme among the many opinions from other jurisdictions that
have considered whether unregistered foreign corporations have transacted intrastate business. 3 9 Whether the business conducted can be char40
acterized as interstate in nature is not the overriding question.
Rather, the issue is whether the foreign corporation has engaged in
commerce that is solely interstate in nature.1 4' That factual determination depends "upon the totality of the relevant circumstances surrounding the corporation's business operations."'42
The Maryland Supreme Court has held that a foreign corporation
transacts intrastate business "when it transacts some substantial part of
its ordinary business therein."' 43 In the same opinion, the court stated
that the determination whether a foreign corporation's in-state activities
constitute the transaction of business depends not on a single factor, but
on the nature and extent of the in-state activities.'" The court listed
the following factors for potential consideration:
[T]he payment of state taxes; the maintenance in the state
of property, an office, telephone listings, employees, agents,
inventory, research and development facilities, advertising,
and bank accounts; the making of contracts; and the extent
or pervasiveness of management functions including

consistent with the precedents discussed supra pt. II.B. regarding constitutional limitations to the
applicability of state qualification statutes.
139. See supra pts. II.C., regarding constitutional limitations, and III.B.1., regarding general
principles arising from Florida case law.
140. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
142. See Contel Credit Corp. v. Tiger, Inc., 520 N.E.2d 1385, 1386 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987);
see also infra note 152 and accompanying text.
143. See S.A.S. Personnel Consultants, Inc. v. Pat-Pan Inc., 407 A.2d 1139, 1141 (Md.
1979) (citing Chesapeake Supply & Equip. Co. v. Manitowoc Eng'r Corp., 194 A.2d 624, 627
(Md. 1963) (considering whether an unqualified foreign employment agency was transacting
intrastate business in procuring an employee for a Maryland employer, in a breach of contract
action brought by the foreign employment agency).
144. See id. at 1142 (citing White v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 201 A.2d 856, 858 (Md.
1964); State ex reL Bickel v. Pennsylvania Steel Co., 91 A. 136, 138 (Md. App. 1914)).
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supervision and control of distributors and services for
customers within the state. 45
Presumably, no one of these factors alone would justify the imposition
of compliance with state registration requirements, so the "extent"
inquiry under this analysis may be of greater consequence than the
"nature" inquiry. Interestingly, the language used by the Maryland
Supreme Court is consistent with the language contained in the official
comments to the MBCA qualification statute.146
However, some courts seem to focus more on the nature of a foreign
corporation's in-state activity than with the extent of that activity. For
instance, in Contel Credit Corp. v. Tiger, Inc., 47 a finance company
sued for the unpaid balance of a telephone equipment lease."4 The
Ohio defendant asserted the affirmative defense that the plaintiff was
precluded from bringing the suit because it was a foreign corporation
transacting intrastate business in Ohio without first obtaining the proper
state license. 149 The Ohio statute exempted from compliance any
foreign corporation engaged solely in interstate commerce."t5 The
Contel court considered whether the activities of the foreign finance
company were solely interstate in nature so that it was exempted from
151
complying with the statute.
The Contel court stated that "[t]he determination of whether a
corporation engages solely in interstate commerce ... is largely factual,
dependent upon the totality of the relevant circumstances surrounding
the corporation's business operations."'" Deferring to a rather aged
holding of the United States Supreme Court,
the Contel court
recognized that activities considered "incidental yet essential" to a

145. Id. at 1142 (citing Gilliam v. Moog Indus., Inc., 210 A.2d 390, 391 (Md. 1965); White
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 201 A.2d 856, 858 (Md. 1964); and Thomas v. Hudson Sales Corp.,
105 A.2d 225, 231 (Md. 1954)).
146. See infra pt. IV for further discussion of a problematic official comment to the
MBCA.
147. 520 N.E.2d 1385 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
148. Id. at 1386.
149. See id. (stating that the plaintiff had failed to comply with state licensing require-

ments).
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. Id. (citing Golden Dawn Foods, Inc. v. Cekuta, 205 N.E.2d 121, 123 (Ohio Ct. App.
1964); Selama-Dindings Plantations, Ltd. v. Durham, 216 F. Supp. 104, 113 (S.D. Ohio 1963),
aff'd sub nom., Selama-Dindings Plantations, Ltd. v. Cincinnati Union Stock Yard Co., 337 F.2d
949 (6th Cir. 1964); Short Films Syndicate Co. v. Standard Film Serv. Co., 176 N.E. 893, 894
(Ohio Ct. App. 1931); 32 Op. Ohio Att'y Gen. 2-92 (1982)).
153. See id. at 1387 (citing York Mfg. Co. v. Colley, 247 U.S. 21 (1918)).
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corporation's interstate commerce are considered part of that interstate
commerce."5 4 If the court had closed its analysis on that point, it might
reasonably have found that the plaintiff's in-state financing and leasing
activities were interstate in nature.
However, the court also recognized that a foreign corporation may
transact intrastate business by conducting through its agents "some
substantial part of its ordinary or customary business, usually continuous
[as] ... distinguished from merely casual, sporadic, or occasional
transactions and isolated acts."' 5 Even more significant is the court's
apparent reliance on a statement from a secondary source that "the
loaning of money by foreign corporations engaged in that business...
is not a matter of interstate commerce, and such corporation may be
subjected to the laws of the state imposing conditions or restrictions
'56
upon its doing business within the limits of such state." The Contel
court concluded that the plaintiff-corporation's lending activities
s
constituted the transaction of intrastate business." As such, the
corporation was not exempted from the Ohio licensing requirement, and
therefore was precluded from maintaining in Ohio its cause of action on
the telephone equipment lease." 8
The Contel opinion is troublesome in that the court began its analysis
with the recognition that such determinations are to be made on the
basis of the "totality of the relevant circumstances surrounding the
corporation's business operations."'5 9 Strangely, however, there is no
evidence that the court conducted such in-depth factual analysis. In fact,
the opinion reveals very little about the nature and extent of the
activities conducted by the Contel plaintiff, other than the allegation in
the assignments of error that it was "engaged in the business of leasing
and financing the sale of telephone equipment within the state of
Ohio."'' " Although not the express holding, the Contel opinion arguably stands for the proposition that the in-state lending and financing
activities of foreign corporations in the business of lending and
financing do not qualify as interstate commerce within the meaning of
the Ohio qualification statute, but are strictly intrastate in nature.

154. See id.
155. See id. (quoting 36 AM. JUR. 2d Foreign Corporations§§ 312, 314-15, 317 (1968)).
156. 17 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
416 Foreign Corporations§ 8419 (1987 Rev. Ed.) (quoted more fully in Contel, 520 N.E.2d at
1387) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the implications of similar problematic language
in an official comment to the MBCA, see infra pt. IV.
157. See Contel, 520 N.E.2d at 1387.
158. See id.

159. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
160. See Contel, 520 N.E.2d at 1386.
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The significance of the Contel decision in other jurisdictions is
greatly mitigated, however, by the fact that Ohio's qualification statute
is not specifically modeled after the corresponding section of the
MBCA."6 In fact, there is no exemption in the Ohio qualification
statute based on creating or acquiring "indebtedness, mortgages, and
security interests in real or personal property," as there is in the Florida
qualification statute. 6 Further, Contel may be distinguished on the
ground that it is not a simple lending case, but rather involves financing
for the purpose of selling or leasing equipment." These distinctions
undermine the possibility that Contel might persuade a Florida court to
find that a foreign corporation was transacting intrastate business solely
on the basis of its in-state lending activities.
IV. THE MYSTERY OF OFFICIAL COMMENT 6 TO SECTION 15.01
OF THE MODEL BusINEss CORPORATE ACT

Despite the plain language of Florida's qualification statute and its
application in Florida case law, the status of the in-state activities of
foreign corporate lenders under that statute potentially remains unsettled.
Because the statute itself is essentially a straightforward adoption of
section 15.01 of the MBCA,' it is reasonable to look to the official
comments to the MBCA for clarification. The general helpfulness of the
comments is somewhat diminished, however, by an ambiguous phrase
which significantly clouds the issues if taken at face value.
Of particular pertinence to the status of the activities of foreign
corporate lenders is Official Comment 6 to section 15.01 of the MBCA.
This comment corresponds to the provisions adopted in Florida as

161. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1703.01-.99 (1997) with MODEL BusINESs CORP.
Acr §§ 15.01-.32 (1984).
162. Compare FLA. STAT. § 607.1501, as set forth supra note 12, with OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1703.02 (Baldwin 1996). The Ohio statute states,
Sections 1703.01 to 1703.31 of the Revised Code do not apply to corporations
engaged in this state solely in interstate commerce, including the installation,
demonstration, or repair of machinery or equipment sold by them in interstate
commerce, by engineers, or by employees especially experienced as to such
machinery or equipment, as part thereof; to banks, trust companies, savings and
loan associations, credit unions, title guarantee and trust companies, bond
investment companies, and insurance companies; or to public utility companies
engaged in this state in interstate commerce.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1703.02 (Baldwin 1996).

163. See Contel, 520 N.E.2d at 1386.
164. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
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subsections 607.1501(g) and (h) of the Florida Statutes. 65 The offending comment states that "[t]he mere act of making a loan by a foreign
corporation that is not in the business of making loans does not
constitute transacting business in the state in which the loan is
made."'" The statement is packed with independent meaning that is
not implied anywhere in the language of the statute itself. It seems to
suggest that a foreign lender in the business of lending, albeit generally
outside of Florida, might be required to qualify in Florida in order to
complete a single loan transaction within the state.
Because such a conclusion seems to clearly contradict the plain
language of section 607.1501, Florida courts may regard the statement
in Official Comment 6 as unpersuasive. Alternatively, given the dearth
of guidance that is available concerning the status of foreign corporate
lenders transacting business in Florida, a court might regard the
statement as highly indicative of legislative intent concerning the
statute's application to foreign corporations "in the business of lending."
Taken alone, the statement potentially reveals the thought processes of
the original drafters of the MBCA, and perhaps the intent of the Florida
legislators who adopted verbatim the corresponding MBCA provisions.
In jurisdictions that have adopted section 15.01 essentially without
change, this should cause an undercurrent of discomfort among attorneys
who have taken notice of the statement and its potential implications,
particularly when called upon to issue legal opinions as to whether
foreign corporate lenders must qualify prior to completing lending
transactions within those jurisdictions.
However, a literal interpretation and application of the problematic
statement in Official Comment 6 is unlikely. Of major importance is the
introductory portion of the Official Comment to section 15.01, which
states that "any conduct more regular, systematic, or extensive than that
described in section 15.01(b) constitutes the transaction of business."' 67
This implies a sort of "sufficiency of contacts" test, with the factors
listed in subsection (b) comprising a baseline of insufficient contacts
from which to begin a factual analysis of the situation. 68 Of further
significance is a statement contained in Official Comment 7, which
generally pertains to isolated transactions, but also addresses the concept
of transacting business. Official Comment 7 states that "[t]he concept of
'transacting business' involves regular, repeated, and continuing business

165.
166.
167.
168.
"question

See supra note 12.

§ 15.01 (1984) cmt. 6 (1984) (emphasis added).
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 15.01 cmt. (1984).
See also MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 15.01 Cmt. 7 (1984) (stating that the
is entirely one of fact").
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
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contacts of a local nature."'69 In other words, sufficiency of contacts
must involve contacts that are of a sufficiently local nature.'
Additionally, an annotation to section 15.01 notably draws attention
to the fact that certain amendments to the Model Act were made in
order to clarify that creating or acquiring indebtedness, mortgages or
security interests did not per se constitute transacting business.'
Specifically, these changes were made in order to "assure lending
institutions that they were not required to obtain a certificate of
authority merely because they acquired indebtedness and security
'
This
therefor in a state in which they were not otherwise present."'
language is consistent with the language of the Official Comments,
previously discussed, which calls for sufficient contacts that are of a
sufficiently local nature.
Taken in context, therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the actual
meaning of Official Comment 6 is more narrow than its potential
meaning out of context. Considering both the actual language of the
MBCA and the general statements in the official comments pertaining
to the concept of transacting business, Official Comment 6 just as well
might have read, "[t]he mere act of making a loan by a foreign
corporation that is not in the business of making loans in that state does
not constitute transacting business in the state in which the loan is
made." 74 As it stands, it is reasonable to interpret the statement to
have that meaning, and to predict that Florida courts, if confronted with
the issue, would interpret it that way. This is consistent with a Florida
Supreme Court opinion recognizing that isolated transactions do not
generally constitute transacting business under qualification statutes,
" 'although they are a part of the very business for which the corporation is organized to transact, if the action of the corporation in engaging
therein indicates no purpose of continuity of conduct in that respect.' ,'S
However, the fact that a foreign corporate lender is or is not in the
business of lending may remain the most unpredictable wild card in the
deck of determinative factors.176 If Official Comment 6 to section
15.01 of the MBCA were taken at face value, it is conceivable, although

169. Id. (emphasis added).
170. See id.
171. See MODEL BusiNEss CORP. AcT ANN. § 15.01, annotation, HistoricalBackground,
at 15-11 (Supp. 1996).
172. See id. (emphasis added).
173. See MODEL BusiNEss CORP. Acr § 15.01 cmt. 7 (1984).
174. See MODEL BusnEss CORP. ACT § 15.01 cmt. 6 (1984) (emphasis added).
175. Crockin v. Boston Store, 188 So. 853, 855 (Fla. 1939) (quoting 14A C. J.1273).
176. See generally supra pts. II. & III. for discussion of other potentially determinative factors.
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unlikely, that a Florida court would find that the mere act of making a
loan by a foreign corporation that is in the business of making loans
constitutes transacting business within the meaning contemplated by the
Florida qualification statute. Although such a finding would not be
directly supported by the content of Official Comment 6, the inference
would be reasonable. Given such a scenario, the constitutional limitations discussed earlier'" might become particularly meaningful to a
foreign corporate lender looking for a reason to avoid the state
qualification requirement.'
V. TRANSACTING BUSINESS: CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTIONS
One author has proposed that a minimum contacts analysis applicable
to personal jurisdiction issues should be adopted as a uniform minimum
threshold in deciding when a state may constitutionally apply its
qualification statute.'79 The pros and cons of that proposal aside, in
most jurisdictions the two types of analysis remain distinct, though
overlapping considerations and terminology sometimes seem to indicate
otherwise. For instance, the requirement that the transaction of business
be "regular, repeated, and continuing"' 80 brings to mind the "continuous and systematic"'"' language invoked where general jurisdiction is
at issue. In fact, a Michigan court found a foreign corporation to have
transacted intrastate business where its activities constituted a "continuous and systematic program of fostering intrastate sales."'82 The same
opinion asserted that the test under the Michigan qualification statute
was whether the foreign corporation exhibited a "purpose expressive of
an intent to do business in Michigan."' 83 That language is deceptively
reminiscent of the "purposeful avalment"'84 concept relevant to
determining whether it is reasonable to subject a defendant to a state's
long-arm statute.

177. See supra pt. II.C.

178. Potential reasons that a foreign corporate lender might want to avoid the qualification
requirement are briefly discussed supra pt. II.B.
179. See Crowe, supra note 4, at 1363; see generally Patricia L. Grove, "Doing Business"
in Oklahoma: Will Minimum Contacts Subject a Foreign Corporation to Oklahoma's

Qualification Statute?, 17 TULSA L.J. 23 (1981) (analyzing the differences and similarities in
the two separate standards of transacting business and minimum contacts in the context of
Oklahoma law).
180. MODEL BusINEss CORP. Acr § 15.01 cmt. 7 (1984) (regarding isolated transactions).
181. See Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984).
182. See Thomas Indus., Inc. v. Wells, 262 N.W.2d 853, 855 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
183. See id. at 856.
184. This language originated with Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
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Both the Florida legislature and Florida courts have recognized a
distinction between transaction of business within the meaning of the
state qualification statute and purposeful availment for purposes of the
state long-arm statute.' This distinction, however, has not always
been clear in Florida.186 In recent years, the First District Court of
Appeal has construed the safe harbor of activities listed in the Florida
qualification statute as also creating exemptions from jurisdiction
pursuant to the Florida long-arm statute." 7 The Florida legislature
responded by amending the state qualification statute to provide, "This
section has no application to the question of whether any foreign
corporation is subject to service of process and suit in this state under
any law of this state."' 8 Consequently, even if a Florida court exercises personal jurisdiction based on a foreign corporation's in-state lending
activities, those same activities may not support a finding that the
foreign corporation must qualify to transact business in Florida under the
qualification statute.
Although it is fair to say that both concepts call into consideration
the nature and extent of in-state activities, the underlying principles are
not the same. Generally, the in-state contacts that justify requiring a
foreign corporation to comply with a qualification statute are greater
than the contacts that justify the application of a state long-arm
statute. 9 Accordingly, the official comment to section 15.01 of the
MBCA also articulates that what constitutes transacting business for
purposes of taxation and service of process invokes standards that are
distinct from the standards applied in determining the necessity of
fulfilling the qualification requirements."' The fact that a foreign
corporation is subject to service of process or state taxation in Florida

185. See Suffolk Fed. Credit Union v. Continental Ins. Co., 664 So. 2d 1153, 1154 n.1 (Fla.
3d DCA 1995).
186. See id.
187. See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Cebeck, 505 So. 2d 539, 540 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
188. See Suffolk, 664 So. 2d at 1154 n.1 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 607.1501(4) (1993), a
provision which remains unchanged in the current version of the Florida door-closing statute);
see also Norman M. Morris Corp. v. Weinstein, 466 F.2d 137, 142 (5th Cir. 1972) (finding that
the Florida qualification statute does not limit the jurisdiction of the federal district courts in
Florida).
189. The Alabama Supreme Court noted that it is easier to find a corporation transacting
business for purposes of service of process than for purposes of a state qualification requirement.
See Johnson v. MPL Leasing Corp., 441 So. 2d 904, 906 (Ala. 1983). Accord Cowan v. First
Ins. Co., 608 P.2d 394, 398 n.3 (Haw. 1980); Goodwin Bros. Leasing, Inc. v. Nousis, 366
N.E.2d 38, 43 (Mass. 1977); Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Ladner, 50 So. 2d 615, 621 (Miss.
1951); Horton v. Richards, 594 P.2d 891, 893 n.3 (Utah 1979).
190. See MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT ANN. § 15.01, annotation, HistoricalBackground,
at 15-10 (Supp. 1996).
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does not necessarily mean that the corporation is required to obtain a
certificate of authority to transact intrastate business in Florida, although
a corporation that is subject to the qualification requirement is likely
also subject to in-state suit and taxation.' Because Florida adopted
section 15.01 of the MBCA with very few changes, the comments to
that section impliedly clarify the meaning of the amendment to the
Florida qualification statute, which states that the statute does not apply
to service of process issues."
In Suffolk Federal Credit Union v. Continental Ins. Co., 93 the
Third District Court of Appeal considered whether a Florida court could
exercise specific jurisdiction over a foreign corporate lender that had
conducted only a single loan transaction in Florida. 94 Construing the
concept of transacting business under the state long-arm statute, the
court concluded that the single transaction was not adequate to support
specific jurisdiction over the Suffolk defendant." Specifically, the
court found that the defendant's in-state activities were not substantial
enough to make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable under the
standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court.196 In light of
the Suffolk court's conclusion and the Official Comment to section 15.01
of the MBCA discussed above, and consistent with the Batavia
rationale, it is reasonable to assume that a single loan transaction also
would not support a finding that a foreign corporation must qualify
under the Florida qualification statute.
Perhaps the most important basis for retaining these conceptual
distinctions was recently pointed out in a New York opinion, in which
it was stated that "[b]oth [issues] raise constitutional questions, but the
latter involves the due process clause while the former involves the
interstate commerce clause. In construing statutes which license foreign
corporations to do business within our State, we must avoid unlawful
interference by the State with interstate commerce."19' 7 As discussed
earlier, Florida courts adhere to this distinction and appear to be

191. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 15.01 cmt.; see also Hillsborough Grocery Co.
v. Ingalls, 53 So. 930, 931 (1910) (stating that "[tihe property of a foreign corporation within
this state is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state").
192. See FLA. STAT. § 607.1501(4) (1995).
193. 664 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
194. See id. at 1154.
195. Id. at 1155.
196. See id. (citing McGee v. International Life Ins., Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)).
197. Great White Whale Adver., Inc. v. First Festival Prods,, 438 N.Y.S.2d 655, 658 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1981).
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concerned with applying the Florida qualification statute in a manner
that does not interfere with interstate commerce. 198
VI. CONCLUSION

This discussion has presented various issues concerning whether
foreign corporations that conduct in-state lending transactions may be
required to register under the Florida qualification statute. Two primary
conclusions stand out. First, in-state lending activity by a foreign
corporation is not per se transaction of intrastate business that requires
compliance with the statute.' 99 Second, Florida courts predictably will
not limit their inquiry to the lending transactions themselves in
determining whether qualification is necessary.2" In actuality, whether
the lending activities of a foreign corporation qualify as the transaction
of intrastate business may ultimately be irrelevant to the determination
of the issues presented in a given case." ' Of greater significance to
Florida courts may be the local policies behind the enactment of the
Florida qualification statute, 202 and the extent to which the statute may
be applied without overstepping its constitutional limitations under the
Commerce Clause. 3
In other words, determination of whether a foreign corporation-and
more specifically, a foreign corporate lender-must qualify in Florida
is a mixed question of law and fact, with results not easily predicted. An
official legislative comment clarifying the determinative value of the
fact that a foreign corporation is "in the business of lending"-in
Florida, or any other state-would be helpful in settling a troublesome
issue at the level of statutory interpretation. However, such clarification
would not diminish a court's responsibility to address the constitutional
questions implicated whenever the substance of a qualification statute
is either affirmatively or defensively raised.

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

See
See
See
See
See
See

supra pts. II.B. & III.B.1.
supra pt. III.B.1. and notes accompanying text.
id.
supra note 12 and pts. II.B. & M.A.
supra pt. II.A.
supra pts. II.C. & III.B.I.
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